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460 PEOPLE v. NuNN [46 0.2d 
No. 57•'18. In Bank. 8, 19.56.] 
THE PEOPI.~E, Hespondent, v. LESLIE HOBERT 
NUNN, Appellant. 
[1] Poisons-Illegal Prescriptions of Narcotics-Evidence.-The 
evidence sustained convictions of a physician for prescribing 
narcotics for a person not under his treatment for a pathology 
(Health & Saf. Code, § 11163) and for prescribing a narcotic 
for a person who represented himself to be an addict (Health 
& Saf. Code,§ 11164), where it showed that the physician gave 
a state narcotics inspector, who represented that he was using 
"H" (which in the vernacular meant heroin), prescriptions for 
dilaudin and was paid in cash, and that he did not make any 
physical examination of the alleged patient and prescribed an 
excessive quantity of the drug. 
[2] Id.-Illegal Prescriptions of Narcotics-Evidence.-In a prose-
cution of a physician for prescribing narcotics for a person 
not under treatment for a pathology and for a person who 
represented himself to be an addict (Health & Saf. Code, 
§§ 11163, 11164), it was proper to permit a narcotics inspector 
to give his opinion that most addictions are caused by criminal 
association and not by the medical profession, where such 
testimony was offered in rebuttal of defendant's testimony 
that he believed the majority of narcotic addictions were pro-
duced from using prescriptions for the relief of pain, and 
where the inspector had a knowledge of the causes of narcotic 
addiction, gained through experience in interviewing addicts 
and study, not possessed by the average man. 
[3a, 3b] !d.-Illegal Prescriptions of Narcotics-Validity of Stat-
ute.-Health & Saf. Code, § 11163, prohibiting prescriptions of 
narcotics for persons not under treatment for a pathology, is 
not unconstitutional as vague, indefinite and uncertain because 
of the words "except in the regular practice of his profession," 
since they cover the activity allowed by Bus. & Prof. Code, 
§ 2137, relating to practice authorized by a physician's certifi-
cate, and those parts of Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11161-11571, 
which give the physician certain rights with regard to nar-
cotics, and since they are well enough known to enable a 
person practicing as a physician and surgeon to understand 
and apply them. 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Drugs and Druggists, !i 33. 
McK. Dig. References: Poisons, § 15; § 14; 
[3,5,9,11,12] Poisons,§!J; [4] CriminalLaw,§9; [6] Words and 
Phrases; [7, 16] Poisons, § 16; [8] Physicians, § 4; [10] Criminal 
Law, §50; [13] Criminttl Law, §410; [14, 15] Criminal Law, §50. 
L 
l'EOPloE '1), 
1,46 FW; 
Prohibition by Law , Validity of Enactment,s. 
with tl11• •·•m~titulional r('quirl"· 
of d1w prot·e~s ol' l;~w, ilw crime for whieh ,jr;[c!ll1nnt is 
must lw cleady dr:lined, hnt it 
that the \Hmls u~cd in the statute be well 
lu ,,nnhlP tlw~e JWrsons within its to undi;rstand and 
them. 
Poisons-Prescribing of Narcotic by Physician-Validity 
Statute.,,~HeaUIJ & SaL Code, § ll~l:30, that a 
shall pn'>'erilw, furnish or admini,;ter nareotics only 
Caiih he b••liev,;s the injury or 
sueh treatment, is not mwonstitutional as 
iJl(JPfinite and urwertain heeause of the words 
" sine•; sueh words havn a definite and well--understood 
n nd are free from ambiguity. 
Words and Phrases-"Good Faith."-The phrase "good faith" 
•:ommon usage has a welJ,defined and generaLly understood 
ordinarily used to describe that state of mind 
honesty of purpose, frP<~dom from intPntion to de, 
iraud; gPncrally Hpe11king, it mcnm; bning faithful to one's 
or obligation. 
[7 Poisons-Illegal Prescriptions of Narcotics-TriaL-~In a pros-
,.,.Htion of u. physieinn for illt>.gal prescriptions of narcotics, 
1lw statutes of' the Health and Safety Code wen' not uncon-
,;t itntionally applied in that state mueotic inspectors were 
,diowed to determine whether or not defendant acted "in the 
practice of his profession" and in "good faith," where 
!he narcotic inspectors testified as to certain facts and defend-
testified to otlwrs and the determination was left to the 
which believed that the facts were as tPstified to by the 
i 11speetors. 
[ 8 j Physicians-Statutes and Regulations.-'rhe Legislature has 
power to regulate thP practice of a profPssion, such as tho 
1ncdieal profe~sion, whieh affects the public hE'alth rmd safety. 
[91 Poisons-Illegal Prescriptions of Narcotics-Validity of Stat-
ute.--Health & Saf. Code, § 11164, prohibiting prescription of 
a nareotic to a person reprpsenting himself to be an addict, is 
unt unconstitutional as leaving the subject of who constitutes 
an addict to speculation and conjecture, since "addict" is de-
tined by Health & Sa f. Code, § llOOB, as "a p('l'Son who unlaw-
1'ully usrs, or is addictrd to the unlawful use of, narcotics.'' 
lOb] Criminal Law-Defenses--Entrapment.--In a prosecu-
tion of a physician for illegal prescriptions of narcotics, de-
See Cal.Jur., Physicians and Surgeons, § 3; Am.Jur., Physi-
cian6 and Surgeons, § 7 et seq. 
[ See CaLJur.2d, Criminal Law, § 205 et seq.; Am.Jur., Crimi, 
nal §§ 335, 336. 
C.2d 
because narcotics 
name and address, 
from the evidence that 
in the mind of defendant, and 
fact that he was solicited to com-
entrapment. 
From 
while investigat-
11164, prohibit-
narcotics for persons not under treatment 
and are immune from prosecution 
WL•~"'"L"' Health 11170, 11170.5, forbidding 
obtain or to obtain narcotics by fraud 
a false name or address in connection 
of a and hence a narcotics 
w1uu1110 any law when he gives a false name 
to buy narcotics from a physician. 
!d.-Obtaining Narcotics by Fraud-Accomplices.-Since a 
narcotics is immune from prosecution for giving a 
name and address in attempting to buy narcotics from a 
he is not an accomplice to the issuance of prescrip-
tions in violation of Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11163, 11164, 
vn.wLow'" prescriptions for persons not under treatment for 
and to addicts. (Pen. Code, § 1111.) 
Criminal Law-Evidence--Evidence Obtained by Unlawful 
Seizure.-Evidence obtained by a narcotics inspector by giving 
a false name and address in attempting to buy narcotics from a 
is not inadmissible in a prosecution of such physi-
cian as been obtained by unlawful search and seizure. 
Id.-Defenses--Entrapment.-Where an accused has a pre-
criminal intent, the fact that when solicited by a 
he commits a crime raises no inference of unlawful 
Id.-Defenses-Entrapment.-Entrapment as a matter of law 
not established where there is any substantial evidence 
which it may be inferred that criminal intent to commit 
offense originated in the mind of the accused. 
Prescriptions of Narcotics-Instructions.-
of a physician for illegal prescriptions of nar-
trial judge did not err in refusing certain of 
defendant's requested instructions where he fully, fairly and 
advised the jury on each and every material issue 
instructions refused were either covered by instruc-
or were not applicable to the facts. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
and from an order denying a new trial. 
Judge. Affirmed. 
was convicted 
a person not under his 
of section 11163 of the Health 
also convicted of one count 
superior 
·'.Jw' " State Narcotics 
went o the office of defendant, who was 
surgeon licensrd to practice in the State of California. 
or Shaw entered the room. iherr-
dcfendant came from his private In-
Shaw said ''I am Dillon,'' and rkfendant 
one '\V alter sent 1" 'l'he 
\l·hir·il he replied that it was "Joe." Defendallt 
hi,; address and was told that H was "2D03 Rodeo 
The doctor entered this information on his pn· 
card, together with the 
Defendant then handed the 
, rPquesting him to sign it on 
Defendant asked the 
which he replied, "I am 
means heroin. Defendant said 
lllfl3 of the H0alth and Safety Corle 
of his profession, no person shan 
narcotic to or for who is not 
or eondition thnn narcotic 
in division.'' 
] 1164 of the Hoallh nnd SafetY Code 
prc·,eril•e for or administer, or ilisppnse n "nnreotir to 
himself as such, except as 
464 PEOPLE v. NUNN [46 C.2d 
prescription for heroin, but I can write for some legitimate 
drug like morphine or dilaudid.'' The inspector said that 
would be all right. 
Defendant then wrote and signed a narcotics prescription 
calling for 60 tablets of 1/16 grain dilaudid to be taken one 
or two every four hours as needed. Defendant handed the 
prescription to the inspector and charged him $20. 
On the patient's history card which was received in evidence 
there had been filled in "1. Migraine Headache" and "2. 
Narcotic Addiction" below the space provided for "Diag-
nosis.'' 
On February 11, 1954, at about 2 p. m., Inspector Shaw 
went to defendant's home at 99 Las Flores Canyon Road, 
Malibu. Defendant was fixing the mail box on his property 
by the main road. Inspector Shaw said to defendant "Hello," 
and defendant asked him if he had a pen. The inspector 
replied that he did not, and defendant said, "My prescription 
books are in the car, but I will have to get my pen." 
They both went in separate cars to the house, which was 
a short distance from the mail box. At the hom;e defendant 
wrote and signed a prescription in a prescription book. De-
fendant asked for the inspector's address again, and the 
inspector said it was 2903 Rodeo Road. Defendant asked 
him if 80 tablets would hold him for a week, to which the 
inspector replied that they would. The inspector told defend-
ant that he liked that very much, and asked him if he could 
come there again the next week. Defendant replied that it 
would be all right. 
Defendant gave the prescription, which called for 80 1/16 
grain tablets of dilaudid, to the inspector, who paid $50 for it. 
On February 18, 1954, at about noon, Mr. Shaw drove to 
defendant's home in Malibu. Defendant answered the inspec-
tor's knock at the door and they both walked out to the car, 
where defendant asked Mr. Shaw if 85 tablets would hold 
him. The inspector said that it would and that he would 
be out of town the next week so he wanted to go to defendant's 
office on the 24th of February. Defendant said that would 
be all right. 
Defendant then wrote and signed a prescription for 85 
tablets of 1/16 grain dilaudid and gave it to the inspector, 
who paid him $40 for it. 
On February 24, 1954, Mr. Shaw went to defendant's office 
in West Los Angeles about noon. There the doctor started 
to write a prescription and asked him if his address was 2903 
Rodeo Road. The inspector said that it was, and the defend-
PEOPLE v. NUNN 
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that as soon as they got the physical examination 
out of the way he could write a prescription for more than 
tablets. This was the only time in the various interviews 
that there was any mention of the inspector's physical con-
the prescription, which called for 85 
tablets, and he paid defendant $40 
JJtj'LtlLu<un never made any physical examination of Inspee-
nor did the inspector ever tell defendant that he 
any physical ailment other than that he was using heroin. 
never at any time told defendant that he suffered from 
headaches or any physical ailment, nor was he 
this period confined in any medical institution of the 
county or city, and he was not under treatment in any 
inE:tituti.on for any ailment or for narcotic addiction. He in 
fact did not use narcotics. 
Defendant relies for reversal of the judgment upon these 
[1] First: That t1~,e evidence was insufficient to support 
flu:; verdicts. 
This contention is devoid of merit. From the facts set 
forth above, the jury was fully justified in believing that 
de:!:'en~iartt had on four different occasions violated section 
of the Health and Safety Code by prescribing a narcotic 
to or for a person not under treatment for a pathology or 
other than narcotic addiction. (Of. People v. 
¥1/M.J,fi'w.113 Cal.App.2d 804, 807 [6) [249 P.2d 35]; Davis v. 
Board of Medica~ Examiners, 108 Cal.App.2d 346, 352 
P.2d 78].) Also that defendant had violated the provi-
sions of section 11164 of the Health and Safety Code in that 
he had prescribed a narcotic for a person representing him-
self as a narcotic user. (Of. Davis v. State Board of Medical 
JJJfhu~mt'li~ers. 108 Cal.App.2d 346, 350 et seq. [239 P.2d 78].) 
Defendant asked Inspector Shaw "What are you usingY" 
and the inspector said "I am using H," which in the ver-
nacnlar means heroin. Defendant clearly understood that 
meant heroin, which is a contraband drug, because he 
answered ''I cannot write a prescription for heroin but I can 
for some legitimate drug like morphine or dilaudid.'' 
then wrote a prescription for dilandid and gave it to the 
The eonclmion is inescapable that Inspector Shaw 
re]Jre:sented himself to be an addict, that defendant believed he 
an addict and prescribed a narcotic for him in a manner 
permitted by law. 
466 PEOPLE 0.2d 
in the evidence. 
Defendant contends that Blanchard was 
his that most narcotic addicts 
criminal association and not the medical 
because it was rebuttal of a collateral matter 
h"'""•h'" out on cross-examination the and was 
immaterial to issues of the triaL 
This contention is untenable. Defendant on direct exami-
nation testified that he believed on 18 and 
24, that 'Dillon" was from a 
ache for which he had previously taken heroin and might be 
an addict, and that he the narcotic in the belief 
that he was properly treating Dillon for a by reliev-
ing his pain. 
The People were in it would be con-
tended defendant was acting reasonably and in the ordinary 
practice of his profession in prescribing the narcotic in the 
amounts that he did, since he had no reason to know or 
believe that such pathology did not exist but had reason to 
believe that it did. 
It was therefore appropriate to ask defendant concerning 
the reasonableness of his conduct and to bring out in connec-
tion with such reasonableness that defendant believed it was 
quite possible that a person using narcotics for the relief of a 
pain would become addicted to the narcotic. Also that he 
believed the majority of narcotic addicts were produced that 
way. The deduction could then be made by the jury that 
most narcotic addicts suffered from pain for which they had 
first taken the narcotics to which they became addicted, and 
that it was more likely a person who was addicted would 
suffer from a painful pathology. This would support defend-
ant's position that he believed that "Dillon" was suffering 
from a painful pathology. 
This deduction could reasonably be controverted by show-
ing that it was not true that most addicts are created by the 
medical profession through the use of narcotics to relieve 
pain. 
To forestall such a deduction and not to impeach defendant, 
the People properly presented the opinion of Inspector 
Blanchard on the subject. 
The evidence disclosed that Inspector Blanchard had a 
knowledge of· the causes of narcotic addiction, gained through 
experience iu interviewing addicts and study, not possessed 
by the average man. He thus qualified as an expert and 
1 
' 
L 
2137 of the Business and Professions Code 
's and surgeon's eertifieate author-
what are known as medical 
and to sever or pene-
and to use any and all 
deformi-
o1 her ph,\·siea1 or men tal conditions.'' 
11161 to 11G71 of the Health and 
and sm·r-;Hms certain to 
and i'c>rtain acts with 
and Professions sections 
for reYocation of the certificate of a and 
for '' conduct'' and 
whieh eonstitutt~ unprofessional conduct. The "regular 
of his '' eovers the allowed by 
and tho:-;e parts 
the physician 
and as long 
1w 1·son 
and apply 
Heali h and Safety Code is constitutionaL 
which specifi-
IYhich arc 
lcnown to 
Defendant further contends that section 11330 of 
tlh• Health and Code is unconstitutional because the 
faith'' i'> too vague, indefinite and uncertain 
468 PEOPLE v. NUNN [46 C.2d 
to form the basis of a criminal This section 
reads: 
"A physician may prescribe for, furnish to, or administer 
narcotics to his patient when the patient is suffering from a 
disease, ailment, injury, or infirmities attendant upon old 
age, other than narcotic addiction. 
"The physician shall prescribe, furnish, or administer nar-
cotics only when in good faith he believes the disease, ail-
ment, injury, or infirmity, requires such treatment. 
''The physician shall prescribe, furnish, or administer 
narcotics only in such quantity and for such length of time 
as are reasonably necessary.'' 
A similar contention was made before the Supreme Court 
of Illinois in People v. Guagliata, 362 Ill. 427 [200 N.E. 
169, 103 A.L.R. 1035]. In disposing of the contention and 
holding that the words "good faith" have a common and 
generally accepted meaning, the court at page 171 [200 N.E.] 
said: ''The words complained against have been defined in 
many cases in many jurisdictions. In Crouch v. First Nat. 
Bank, 156 Ill. 342 [40 N.E. 974, 979], we said that 'good faith' 
means 'honest, lawful intent,' and in McConnel v. Street, 
17 Ill. 253, we said that 'good faith' is the 'opposite of fraud 
and bad faith.' Numerous cases in other jurisdictions give 
substantially similar definitions. A liberal construction should 
be given constitutional provisions in order to sustain legisla-
tive enactments, and all doubts and uncertainties arising from 
the Constitution, as well as the statute, should be resolved 
in favor of the validity of the statute. (Citing cases.) The 
words 'good faith,' as used in paragraph 3, have a definite 
and well-understood meaning, are free from ambiguity, and 
their use in the act does not violate the due process clause 
of the State or Federal Constitution. (Citing cases.) '' 
[6] The phrase "good faith" in common usage has a 
well-defined and generally understood meaning, being ordi-
narily used to describe that state of mind denoting honesty 
of purpose, freedom from intention to defraud, and, generally 
speaking, means being faithful to one's duty or obligation. 
(See 18 Words and Phrases (perm. ed. 1940), p. 475 et seq.; 
35 C.J.S. (1943), p. 488; Bouvier's Law Diet. (Rawle's 
3d rev. 1914), p. 1359.) 
[5b] We therefore hold that the words "good faith" as 
used in Health and Safety Code, section 11330, have a definite 
and well-understood meaning, are free from ambiguity, and 
their use in the statutes does not violate the due process 
clause of the federal Constitution. 
I 
i 
f 
' l 
~ 
t 
L 
PEOPLE 4()!) 
[46 C.2d 460; 296 P.2d 8l:l] 
Defendant fnrth{~r contcnrls that tlw statutes of th{' 
and Safety Code aw rmeonstitutionally applied in 
1 ha1 t lu~ insp<'etors from the State Bureau of Nareoties Bn-
rather than defendant, were allowed to determine 
"·b·i ht:r or not defrndant acted ''in the reg11lar practicn of 
]1is " and in "good faith." This is not the ease. 
The mu·cotie inspeetors testified to c(~rtain facts; defendant 
testified to others. The determination of whether defendant 
"in the l'(~gular practice of his profession" and in "good 
faith" ·was left to the jury, ·which believed the facts were 
as to by the inspector, and that such facts did show 
that defendant had not acted "in the regular practice of 
his profession'' and in ''good faith.' 
: That Health and Safety Code, srction 11164, is 
because (1) the Legislature cannot depr£ve 
a doc! or of the right to prescribe for any patient, including 
one who may be an addict, and the section leaves the 
of who constitutes an addict to spem~lalion and con-
'fhi:s proposition is untenable. [8] ( l) 'J'he Legislature 
has the po·wer to regulate the practice of a profes;;ion which 
al'f\•ds the public health and safety. (Of. Hewitt v. State 
Board of 1Ylcd1:cal E:x:aminers, 148 Cal. 590 at 592 !84 P. 39, 
11:l Am.St.Hep. :H5, 7 Ann.Ca:s. 750, ;{ hRA.N.S. 896]; 
v. Ratledge, 172 CaL 401 at 405 [Hi6 P. 455].) 
[9] (2) Addict is defined in section 11009 of the Health 
and Safety Code as follows: " 'Addict,' as used in this 
means a person who unlawfully uses, or is addicted 
to the unlawful use of, nareotics." 'l'herefore, the question 
of \rho constitutes an addict is not left to speeulation and 
but is dearly and definitely defined by law. 
[lOa] ]11 ifth: That defendant was trnlawfuUy entrapped. 
'!'his contention is likewise without merit. 'fhe trial judge 
and eompletely instructed the jury npon the law 
Ielatiye io entrapment. 
Ddendant elaims that th,• nareotie~ insp<'dor's ads in 
a false name an(l address and tdling him he was 
"1l" \\'er·e ill(·ga! aml that a c:onvi,:1 ion I'(~Sltlting from 
I Ire nse of ••videne,; secured by Rlleh ads is against pnbl ic: 
pol , vuid, and a ,lenial 1Jf t!J(' dw• J.ll'O(:<'Scl uf law. 
lfr;:dllt and Safety Cod,·, sediu11s 11170 and] 1170.G, forbid 
ally person to "obtain or attempt to obtain nareoiit:s (a) by 
fraud. deceit, misrepresentation, or subtrrfuge; or (b) by 
ihr concealment of a material fact," or to give a false 
470 PEOPLE 
name m connection with the 
narcotic. 
Health and 
authorized 
of this division 
under 
Yision or al'e immune from "'"""'"'" 
division. 
C.2d 
of a 
Health and sections 11170.5 and 11710, 
are all in division 10 of such as are sections 11163 and 
a violation of which sections defendant was 
guilty. 
[11] authorized peace while investigating 
violations of Health and Safety sections 11163 and 
11164, are immune from for violating such sec-
tions. Since Shaw was a narcotics inspector for the 
State of California, and was acting to the orders 
of his chief, ·walter Creighton, who told him to go to defend-
ant's office and use the name "Joe Dillon" to see if defend-
ant would write a prescription for narcotics for him, the 
inspector was engaged in enforcing the laws regulating 
the prescribing of narcotics by investigating to see whether 
or not defendant had l:l.n existing intention of ignoring the 
laws forbidding his prescribing narcotics except under certain 
specified circumstances, and was performing his official duties. 
He was immune from prosecution while investigating vio-
lations of the provisions of sections 11170 and 11170.5 of the 
Health and Safety Code. Thus, contrary to defendant's 
contention, he was not violating any law and his acts were 
not illegal when he gave a false name and address in attempt-
ing to buy narcotics from defendant. (See United States v. 
Swift, 186 F. 1002 at 1017.) [12] Because the inspector was 
immune from prosecution for the acts which he performed, 
there is no merit in defendant's contention that he was an 
accomplice to the issuance of the prescriptions in violation 
of Health and Safety sections 11163 and 11164, as an 
accomplice must be liable to prosecution for the identical 
offense charged against the defendant. (Pen. Code, § 1111.) 
Here the inspector was immune from such prosecution. 
[13] Defendant urges certain language used in People v. 
Cahan, 44 Cal.2d 434 at 472 P.2d 905), in support of his 
contention that the People should not be permitted to use 
the evidence obtained by the narcotics inspector because he 
procured it by false representations. The language used in 
the Cahan case had reference to the facts in such case and 
0 
t 
e 
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criminal intent 
mind of the 
372 
instant case it is clear the was 
from the evidence that the criminal intent 
in the mind of defendant and therefore the mere 
\ras solicited a the crime 
inference of an unlawful 
Sixth: That the trial court to 
'instn1ctions 
contention is devoid of merit. An examination of the 
shows that the trial and clearly 
on each and every material issue and that 
the instructions by defendant and refused were 
covered by instructions read the to the jnry 
not to the facts in the instant case. 
and order a new trial are each 
C. J., Shenk, 
concurred. 
J.-I dissent. 
J., and 
agree that any law of the State of California per-
officer to go about a fictitious name and make 
statements to induce a doctor to prescribe a narcotic or 
JHC;\.H'ClLl<;:; that requires a for a and to mis-
t1Jat he is such Such conduct, whether 
by officer, or anyone else, violates sections 11170, 11170.5 
and 11171 of the Health and Safety Code. 
11170 of the Health and Code provides as 
folluws: '' No person shall obtain or to obtain 
or procure or attempt to procure the administration 
-rw"'"'''"'"+'"'" for narcotics, by fraud, deceit, misrep-
or subterfuge; or (b) by the concealment of a 
material fact .... (3) No person shall, for the purpose of 
472 PEOPLE v. NUNN [46 C.2d 
obtaining falsely assume the title of, or represent 
himself to be [here follows a list of authorized persons] or 
other authorized per·son . ... " (Emphasis added.) 
Section 11170.5 of the Health and Safety Code says: "No 
person shall, in connection with the prescribing, furnishing, 
administering, or dispensing of a narcotic, give a false name 
or false address.'' 
Section 11171 reads : ''No person shall obtain or possess 
a prescription that does not comply with this division.'' (Em-
phasis added.) 
It is plain from the foregoing that the officer violated every 
one of these mandates of the Legislature. He obtained each 
of the prescriptions involved in this case (a) by fraud, deceit, 
misrepresentation, and subterfuge; and (b) he concealed a 
material fact, namely his true identity. 
He represented himself to be an authorized person, which 
he was not. 
He obtained and possessed prescriptions that did not comply 
with the provisions of the Health and Safety Code. There-
after he falsely had them filled in violation of section 11170 
of the Health and Safety Code. 
The Legislature clearly intended these sections to apply to 
all persons. 
False and fictitious use of one's name and misrepresentation 
of one's character are fraud and deceit, which the statute 
expressly forbids. Fraud vitiates everything. It nullifies 
judgments obtained thereby. 
If these statutes that expressly forbid any person to use 
these means, are changed by judicial construction, to author-
ize an officer to obtain a prescription (a) by fraud, deceit, 
misrepresentation, or subterfuge; or (b) by concealment of a 
material fact, or by giving a false name or address, or obtain 
or possess a narcotic that does not comply with these provi-
sions of the Health and Safety Code, then such sections, 
if thus construed and applied, violate due process of law 
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitu-
tion of the United States. That constitutional guarantee 
provides for American standards for the administration of 
justice and conduct consistent with the fundamental princi-
ples of liberty and justice must lie at the base of all our civil 
and political institutions. (Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 
312, 316 [47 S.Ct. 103, 71 L.Ed. 270, 48 A.L.R. 1102]; 
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 100 [29 S.Ct. 14, 53 
L.Ed. 97] ; Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 323, 325, 326 
[58 S.Ct. 149, 82 L.Ed. 288]; Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 
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S.Ct. 374, 91 L.Ed. 422] ; Adamson v. California, 
.S. 46, 53 [67 S.Ct. 1672, 91 L.Ed. 1903, 171 A.L.R. 
obtaining of a prescription from a duly licensed doctor 
means of fraud, deceit and misrepresentation-in violation 
of the express commands of the Legislature-is reprehensible, 
and contrary to the conscience of mankind. This 
court is not authorized to legislate that it is lawful or to 
it judicially. If it does, then the statutes, as thus 
violate the F'ourteenth Amendment to the Consti-
of the United States. 
the knowing presentation of perjured testimony in a 
prosecution amounts to the denial of due process of 
law (Jlooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 [55 S.Ct. 340, 79 L.Ed. 
791, 98 A.L.R. 406]), it should follow as a matter of course 
that evidence obtained by means of fraud, deceit and mis-
representation should have the same effect. 
'rhe purity of the courts belongs to the courts. (Sorrells v. 
United States, 287 U.S. 435 [53 S.Ct. 210, 77 L.Ed. 413, 86 
A.L.R. 249] ; People v. Cahan, 44 CaL2d 434 [282 P.2d 905] 
an(l cases cited therein.) 
\Yhen the officer in this case falsified his name and char-
acter he acted in an individual capacity, for the state did 
not authorize him to act falsely and fraudulently and to vio-
late the express provisions of the Health and Safety Code. 
I3ut if we approve such conduct then we become a party to it. 
'rh is the court cannot do, lest the citizen shall say, "If the 
officer can falsify, why can't we?" Courts of justice must set 
an example of truth and justice and equal application of the 
law's mandates to officers and citizens alike, lest the bad 
of one shall lead to misconduct of the other. Civilized 
standards of due process guaranteed by the federal Consti-
tution forbid this. 
I do not think this court or any court sJwnld ratify, adopt 
and approve s11ch lawless disregard of honesty, decency and 
ihc express and plain provisions of the Health and Safety 
Code as written and adopted by our lawmakers. 
Por the foregoing reasons and those stated in my dissenting 
opinion in People v. Braddock, 41 Cal.2d 794, 803 [264 P.2d 
5211, I would reverse the judgment and grant defendant a 
new trial 
.\pJH:llaut 's petition for a relwarin~ was denied June 6, 
HICJH. Carter·, ,T., \\·as of the opinion that the petition should 
granted. 
